隆美尔是否被过誉？ 第1页

对隆美尔的评价还是很复杂的

一般军事书籍谈隆美尔日常的评价就是战术天才战略矮子。

对这个评价最有力的支持实际上是出自戴维欧文的《狐狸的踪迹》里面的，其实里面说龙德施泰特说隆美尔只配当师长这话并不怎么硬，因为本来就没几个人跟狐狸关系有多好。这话也很可能是一个因为派系争斗的气话。

另外龙德施泰特这人评价人一般都是有需要的。在对法国作战开始之前，龙德施泰特对于克莱斯特装甲集群能不能突破阿登有疑虑。强行安排步兵为主的作战计划。在步兵和装甲兵之间互相撕逼过程中，龙德施泰特把对面甘末林吹成盖世神将。甘末林的大大的厉害，你们的小伎俩遇到他都死了死了的！

结果甘末林愣是能干出来不相信下面的电报导致白费三天时间让德军突破默兹河的事情。

所以老龙这个评价人日常不怎么靠谱。

这书里面隆美尔对战略认识表现最蛋疼的在隆美尔在去北非之前那段精彩回答

1941年3月19日在柏林开了个会议，主要就是隆美尔阐述自己的非洲计划。当时总参谋长弗朗茨·哈尔德和陆军总司令勃劳希契元帅基本上达成共识。德军只能在非洲投入3,4个师。拖的越久越有利（德军已经在做攻击苏联的准备了，不可能对非洲有什么大的想法。）

哈尔德回忆中说：隆美尔宣称不久后他就会征服埃及和苏伊士运河，他又谈到德国的东非，我遏制不住自己，发出了不礼貌的笑声。接着我问他，为了达到这一目的他还要什么要求，他认为还需要两个装甲军。
哈尔德问了关键的问题，即使德军能派出两个装甲军，你怎么给他们提供补给。
隆美尔回答的贼经典：这对我无所谓，那是你的事情……

就这个态度指望德军内部有多少人夸隆美尔？反正我是没看见战时有夸他的。

反过来见过一个黑隆美尔最可怕的例子，是在quora上一个荷兰陆军教员。这位的观点隆美尔做连长都不合格（作为日常隆黑我都被吓坏了）。

Quintin Van Zyl, PhD War Studies, King's College London (2019)
Dear God, not for his tactics, please.‘
Rommel was an odd fish. He was either a tactical genius, or a complete (yet very lucky) muppet. I’m leaning towards the latter.‘
Make no mistake, here was an officer who loved campaigning, who cared deeply for his troops, and who respected his fellow officers. In his First World War memoirs (Infantry Attacks), there are only two instances of criticism of fellow officers throughout – both reasonable, and both of subordinate officers under enemy fire.
He also displayed significant personal courage – at least, I think he did. The reason for the uncertainty is that Rommel displayed a remarkable lack of situational awareness at times, punctuated with clear instances of ‘not thinking it through’. He was an impulsive, impatient, lead-from-the-front type of guy. For instance, (and from his memoirs) during one attack, as it stalled, Rommel gathered a couple of soldiers (as was his MO) and crashed through the thick undergrowth, surprising a group of French soldiers in the process. Rommel shot a few poilus, and then ran out of ammunition. Click, click, click. At this stage, he was on his own… his ad hoc section had not followed him. For his trouble, a French soldier shot, and seriously wounded him (one of seven occasions of being injured during the war), and Rommel was lucky to survive that encounter. Was it courage? Was it stupidity? Was it luck?
I’ll provide you with one account (with opinions) from his memoirs and allow you to decide for yourself: the incident at a small Belgian village called Bleid(when I say ‘small’, I mean ten houses and a church). This was right at the start of the hostilities (and Rommel’s first contact). Rommel was a platoon commander at the time, and he left his platoon in defensive positions as he scouted ahead with a small team.
Whilst out, he noticed ‘fifteen or twenty’ French soldiers drinking coffee in the middle of the highway that passes through Bleid. If Rommel had situational awareness, he would have said to himself: ‘fifteen or twenty soldiers are short of a platoon – usually around 35 soldiers and an officer. Where are the rest of the enemy?’ Except, Rommel never asked that question. Convinced that these French soldiers were the only ones fielded by France for the entire war (I’m being sarcastic), Rommel decided to attack this group. Still, nothing wrong with a bit of aggression, heh?
Now, if Rommel had any tactical nous, he would have realised: ‘my group is only four – including myself – and I’ve been taught that I should attack at a 3:1 superiority (which I can just about justify). Let me head back, collect my platoon, and then raze this place.’ Yes? No! Rommel decided to attack with the small reconnaissance patrol at his disposal. Four German soldiers against ‘fifteen or twenty’ (but more than likely 36) French soldiers. It’s a good thing that all this élan paid off then, isn’t it? Except it didn’t. In real life it never does, no matter what your name is. The French platoon (yup, surprise Erwin! There were more!) returned his fire, and Rommel had to withdraw – quickly.
I can go on, and on, and on – there are so many examples of this: Rommel showed time and again that he had the luck of Satan himself – situation upon situation where Rommel had multiple options, some of them actually quite good… and he would choose the least sound tactical option without fail - and then somehow still managed to pull a rabbit out of the hat.
How did he get away with it for so long? His impulsiveness resulted in unpredictability. His antics were often so outlandish, that rather than responding, the enemy wasted so much time thinking: What? Who is this lunatic?
Then again, he didn’t always get away with it.
Having trained hundreds of infantry officers - including on tactics, I’m not sure how I would have dealt with this one. I think, perhaps with some irritation. Tacticians do not plan on miracles, luck, or hope. Tacticians do not showboat. They get in, get it done, get out. Not Rommel though.
I think people who know tactics (and have studied his memoirs) like him for that ‘lucky tactical clumsiness’, but will not emulate him. Those unfamiliar with tactics, and who are blinded by élan may be too impressionable for an informed opinion.

这个就简直黑出炭了。隆美尔的战术行动确实有依赖突然性，从法国到北非都有依赖对方心理素质太差遇到突然袭击崩溃后的例子。但是不代表非得稳妥了才出战。这种在二战那种信息不畅日常跑丢人的战场上会贻误战机的。

至于某些贴吧群体就是完全靠自己需要，反对希特勒进攻苏联的，就日常编造一个能打穿中东逼迫英国投降的神话，自然要把隆美尔的战术神话高高举起。

（然而打穿苏伊士之后隆美尔自己想的是恢复德属东非，抱歉让诸位的期待失望了。）而且夸大中东战场如何如何根本没有意义。

有的贴吧真的是因为崇拜隆美尔对戴维欧文那本书各种怒斥。各种看不上，然后除了某些鸡毛蒜皮之外根本就驳斥不了一些根本性的东西。

（而且戴维欧文那本书可以说是夸大隆美尔北非战绩之冠。日常隆美尔可用坦克四十五十，这都太扯了。）

然后有些人就是喜欢黑意大利而已，实际上连隆美尔本人虽然日常黑意，遇到被德国人训练的意大利伞兵他也捏着鼻子承认不那么差。完全当意大利人不存在，北非这仗早完蛋了。别说战术神话，死磕神话都打不出来。

连《狐狸的踪迹》那本书都没看过的，你可以当他评价的隆美尔就是扯淡了。

而且大多数人基本上都属于人云亦云。该夸隆美尔的都夸不到地方

狐狸的战术体系在一战发端。在二战应用于装甲战上形成现实。战术讲究突然性和大胆穿插。从法国战场开始，经常有全部部队集中火力开火。突然攻击导致对方军心崩溃的行动。

从这一点可以看出来，面对准备不足，指挥官应变能力差或者不够灵活的对手，狐狸这种战术绝对是一打一个准。

比如在法国面对已经风声鹤唳的法国军队，在北非面对英军动不动夜间会合的时候，狐狸经常一打一个准。

然而反过来突然性的缺点就是，狐狸经常片面夸大心理状态的作用，用突然性补全兵力问题。手里只要有人多强的阵地他都敢往上撞。

在阿拉斯由于冲的过快被准备好的英军截断。狐狸差点混战中挂点。第一次托布鲁克之战拉点兵就上。撞的头破血流都是这个原因。

反过来而言狐狸最无懈可击精彩绝伦的，实际上是在局部反击过程中的精准操作，他擅长部署精细到每一门炮的反坦克阵地，让英军自己进攻过程中撞上来导致坦克纵队迟滞，然后产生分裂和调度困难。最后被狐狸的预备队反击打倒。

狐狸玩反坦克炮的水准高于他玩坦克的水准，并且对于反坦克炮，地雷这些技术装备他还能自己画图进行改造设计。高端技术宅水平。这一点对他部署大西洋壁垒有很大益处

然而在北非沙漠狂奔路途上狐狸做不到对全军精准的把控，就经常抓着手里一点部队就上。在对方有准备的时候乱七八糟的就失败了。

在阿拉曼战役全军已经补给限度低于50%，装甲部队没有足够油料做出合适的防御反击动作，英军又占据绝对物质优势的时候。哪怕狐狸没因病回国，操作再精准，也无回天之力。

然而跑出补给限度，以及动不动用补给卡车队伍当佯攻队导致补给断绝，这都是狐狸的缺点。

而突尼斯战役，在凯塞林山口反击大获全胜的光环下，大多数人都忘了一个问题，这一场反击战严格来说算德军输了，狐狸自己吹要打出突尼斯，打进阿尔及利亚，全歼美军。因为装甲师补给问题半途而废，没达到目的。整场突尼斯战役从1942年11月开始运过去的一大堆部队，最后变成了给北非盟军的大礼包。除了让狐狸爽了一把之外基本没啥用。

北非在失去班加西之后几乎可以说已经陷入垃圾时间，不如撤回西西里。

狐狸一生中最重要的北非时段最后就成了这个样子，各种操作秀人一脸，然而没有卵用。

在法国狐狸有偷人坦克和渡河器材抢在友军前面渡河的前科（倒是跟巴顿的一些段子一样）。

北非跟下属差点闹到要扔勋章决斗。被部下军长当面呛。搞到非洲军参谋部甚至故意弄丢他的命令文件不服从命令。随便乱送人上军事法庭，最后证明大部分是胡闹。给总部打了一串一会儿报捷一会儿药丸的电报，整的大本营心惊肉跳，发电报问他你发事情能不能连续点。

真打算吹到地方，倒不如真的去吹诺曼底。诺曼底虽然必败，却反而是狐狸真正的高光时刻。除却加莱登陆一点出了问题以外（还情有可原）。狐狸的判断都是对的。

在狐狸去诺曼底之前，龙德施泰特虽然是西线总司令，但是因为跟希特勒的冲突已经抱着一套老夫是咸鱼老夫不说话老夫懒得做事的态度在西线磨洋工了。

狐狸：你枉活六十有九！

确定龙德施泰特和他的参谋部真的管不上用场之后。转身狐狸就去督造大西洋壁垒，一个一个军师指挥部搞突然袭击，催促士兵加紧埋设地雷和训练，在整个西线因为和平了三年多已经文恬武嬉的状态下绝对是一股清流。

指挥部上朽木为官，巴黎花街禽兽处处。

而同时海空军拒不配合，空军方面跟狐狸吹大气有一千架战斗机支援西线获取制空权，结果最后没到。而且海空军哪怕在诺曼底登陆开启之后各自获得近两万吨各种物资，狐狸居然没有任何调配权力……

参谋部内遍地都是720密谋分子，除了忽悠狐狸还有第二场加莱登陆之外就是密谋反对希特勒。

在装甲师预备队部署上狐狸提出装甲师向前部署，因为对于盟军空中优势的担心，狐狸认为放后方绝对来不及顶着轰炸再支援滩头，结果一堆装甲兵军官可劲围攻，对狐狸的一大堆各种做不了师长乃至于不会用装甲兵的攻讦都是这时候出现的，包括古德里安在内。

虽然后来证明狐狸的想法没错，但是仍然只获得了三个装甲师的指挥权，其余四个只能放到后方甚至德国境内。

狼心狗行之辈，汹汹当朝，奴颜婢膝之徒，纷纷秉政

然后到登陆当天狐狸自己是飙车回去，结果一个装甲师所有作战军官在巴黎嫖妓嫖到失联。一个装甲师部署距离离滩头过远。最后一个慌张集结完毕，把盟军空投物资当成伞兵，擅自停止。

最后第一天谁也没到。

饶是如此盟军的滩头战斗依然打的险象环生，如果真要是完全按照狐狸的部署七个装甲师24小时内压上滩头，盟军最好的结果也不过是个安奇奥再现……

在狐狸一辈子最后一战，上司靠不住，同僚靠不住，下属靠不住，希特勒不信任，各种权利倾轧，间谍忽悠，敌军又有绝对优势情况下。卡昂之战仍然打的布莱德雷劝蒙哥马利含笑忍辱。

最后还惦记写信给希特勒向自己的参谋长求情（尽管此人一直在忽悠他还有一场加莱登陆）。

临终之日衣衫整齐服毒。

非常具有莎翁悲剧意味的结果，比起法国北非意大利一串狗屁倒灶的破事强的太多了。

而且狐狸确实没啥战争罪行，毕竟在北非，急眼了还能屠杀黑叔叔不成。在北非零星几个居民点真要是闲得蛋疼搞大屠杀导致水源补给断绝真的是要把非洲军半路就葬送了。

本人也没啥特别乌七八糟的花边绯闻和抢劫财物的破事。

虽然对士兵要求高，但是也没有干出来没事把玩忽职守的士兵弄死的暴虐行为。也没听说有啥虐俘行为（狐狸本身对于主要对手英国人还一直算是敬重）。

在时不时就有各路黑账翻出来的德三人马里面真是干净的不得了了。更何况还是个死人。吹吹也没什么要紧。

总之，如果题主听到的对狐狸的评价，不超出：才干不错。战术大胆，比较激进，对后勤忽视。对训练和作战准备负责，精力旺盛。清教徒生活习惯。

大致就算不上过誉。说不全最多只能是不全面。至于非要拔高北非战场意义的那都是醉翁之意不在酒

过誉？

德国人吹，英国人吹，美国人吹

小胡子吹，邱胖子吹，蒙帅吹，巴顿也吹

就21世纪一群连步兵攻击都没看完的小同学们说隆不在就是个师长水平？

你让巴尔克干嘛去？

韩国的一所监狱里，三名囚犯在讨论自己被捕的原因。

金明焕：“我因为发动工会被文在寅关了进来。”

李相熙：“我因为破坏工会被文在寅关了进来。”

最后一名囚犯：“我就是文在寅。”