如何拦截东风17乘波体导弹？

intercepting the DF17 hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) is an extremely complex challenge, currently at the forefront of missile defense research and development. Its unique characteristics present significant hurdles for existing and even nearterm defense systems. Here’s a detailed breakdown of the difficulties and potential, albeit challenging, countermeasures:

Understanding the DF17’s Threat Profile:

Before discussing interception, it’s crucial to understand why the DF17 is so difficult to counter.

Hypersonic Speed: The DF17 travels at speeds exceeding Mach 5 (five times the speed of sound). This dramatically reduces the reaction time for detection, tracking, and engagement systems. Traditional missile defense radars, which rely on predicting trajectories based on slower ballistic paths, struggle to lock onto and maintain a clear track.
Maneuverability (Glide Phase): Unlike traditional ballistic missiles that follow a predictable parabolic trajectory after boost, the DF17’s HGV detaches from its booster rocket and glides through the atmosphere. During this glide phase, the HGV is capable of significant lateral and vertical maneuvers. This makes trajectory prediction incredibly difficult, as it can change course unpredictably, evading defensive interceptors that are locked onto a predicted static path.
Low Altitude and Atmospheric Flight: The HGV glides within the Earth’s atmosphere, rather than in the vacuum of space like a traditional ballistic missile. This means:
Radar Signature: It interacts with the atmosphere, creating a different radar signature compared to objects in space.
Escape Velocity: It doesn't need to achieve or maintain spacelike velocities for its entire flight, making it more agile.
Atmospheric Effects: The air friction can generate heat and plasma, which can further complicate radar tracking (though this can also be an identifying characteristic).
Conformal Design and Radar CrossSection (RCS): Hypersonic glide vehicles are often designed to be aerodynamically stable and can have shapes that minimize their radar crosssection, making them harder for early warning and tracking radars to detect and classify.
Combined Threat: The DF17 can be launched by various boost vehicles, some of which might also be capable of delivering conventional or nuclear warheads. This means the defense system needs to be prepared for different types of incoming threats.

Challenges for Existing Missile Defense Systems:

Most current missile defense systems are designed to counter traditional ballistic missiles or cruise missiles. They struggle with the DF17 because:

MidCourse Interception: Systems like the U.S. GroundBased Midcourse Defense (GMD) are designed to intercept ballistic missiles in their midcourse phase (in space). While GMD interceptors are fast, the DF17’s atmospheric maneuvers during its glide phase mean it might not be in a predictable position in space for interception. Furthermore, the HGV spends a significant portion of its flight within the atmosphere.
Terminal Phase Interception: Systems like the Patriot or THAAD are primarily designed for terminal phase intercepts (as the missile reenters the atmosphere and approaches its target). By the time a DF17 reaches the terminal phase, its speed and maneuverability leave very little time for the interceptor to react and achieve a kill.
Kinetic Kill Vehicle (KKV) Limitations: Current KKVs rely on precise trajectory prediction to collide directly with the target. The unpredictable maneuvers of an HGV make it exceedingly difficult for a KKV to achieve this direct impact.

Potential Countermeasures and Interception Strategies (Highly Complex and Evolving):

Intercepting the DF17 requires a multilayered, highly integrated, and technologically advanced approach. Here are some of the key areas being explored and developed, though none offer a guaranteed solution at present:

1. Enhanced Early Warning and Tracking:

SpaceBased Sensors: Deploying a constellation of advanced satellites equipped with infrared (IR) and radar sensors. These sensors can detect the heat signature of the booster rocket during launch and track the HGV itself during its glide phase, even through atmospheric clutter. The goal is to provide persistent, global coverage.
Advanced GroundBased Radars: Developing and deploying nextgeneration radars with significantly greater range, resolution, and processing power. These radars need to be capable of:
Discriminating: Distinguishing the HGV from decoys or atmospheric phenomena.
MultiObject Tracking: Simultaneously tracking multiple fastmoving, maneuvering targets.
HighRate Updates: Providing very frequent positional updates to guide interceptors.
Networked Sensor Fusion: Integrating data from all available sensors (space, air, sea, ground) into a common operating picture. This allows for a more robust track on the HGV, even if individual sensors have intermittent or lowerquality data.

2. Advanced Interceptor Technologies:

Higher Speed and Agility: Developing interceptor missiles that are faster, more maneuverable, and have more responsive control systems. This is essential to match the DF17’s speed and ability to change direction.
Advanced Guidance Systems:
Onboard Seekers: Equipping interceptors with sophisticated, highresolution seeker heads that can autonomously track and engage a maneuvering target in the terminal phase or during its atmospheric glide. These seekers might employ advanced radar, electrooptical, or even multispectral sensors.
DataLink Updates: Maintaining a robust data link between the ground (or spacebased command) and the interceptor to provide updated targeting information as the HGV maneuvers. This requires highly resilient communication channels.
Kinetic Kill Variants: Designing KKVs with improved onboard guidance and control to allow for midflight course corrections necessary to intercept a maneuvering target.
Directed Energy Weapons (DEWs):
HighEnergy Lasers (HELs): Lasers can, in theory, engage targets at the speed of light. The challenge lies in delivering enough energy to damage or destroy the HGV's structure or control surfaces, especially through atmospheric distortions. The HGV's speed also means the laser must dwell on a single spot for a sufficient duration.
HighPower Microwaves (HPMs): HPMs could potentially disrupt or damage the HGV's electronic systems and guidance. However, their effectiveness against a hardened HGV, especially at range, is still a significant question.
"HittoKill" Enhancements: Improving the precision of KKV guidance to allow for "nearmiss" engagements where even a very close pass might be sufficient to disrupt the HGV's flight path through aerodynamic forces or fragmentation.

3. Layered Defense and Engagement Zones:

MultiLayered Approach: No single system is likely to be sufficient. A robust defense would involve multiple layers of sensors and interceptors designed to engage the HGV at different points in its flight:
Boost Phase Defense (Difficult for HGV): While theoretically the easiest to counter, the booster rocket phase is short and often happens over adversary territory. Direct boost phase interception of the HGV's booster is highly unlikely to be the primary defense strategy due to launch location limitations.
MidCourse Defense (Challenging for HGV): Attempting to intercept during the glide phase before it makes its most radical maneuvers might be possible with advanced systems. This phase is still largely within the atmosphere.
Terminal Phase Defense (Extremely Difficult for HGV): Engaging the HGV as it approaches the target, where reaction times are minimal.
Engagement Zones: Establishing specific "kill boxes" or engagement zones where interceptors are most likely to be successful, based on predicted but highly uncertain trajectories.

4. Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I):

Decision Support Systems: Developing sophisticated AI and data processing capabilities to rapidly analyze sensor data, predict potential HGV trajectories, and generate engagement solutions.
Resilient Communications: Ensuring that communication channels between sensors, command centers, and interceptors are secure and resistant to jamming or disruption.

Illustrative (Hypothetical) Interception Scenario:

Imagine a scenario where an DF17 is launched:

1. Detection: A constellation of early warning satellites detects the infrared signature of the booster rocket. As the HGV separates and begins its glide, spacebased radar and IR sensors attempt to track its flight path and its initial velocity.
2. Tracking and Prediction: Groundbased, advanced phasedarray radars pick up the HGV as it enters the denser atmosphere. These radars must contend with atmospheric clutter and the HGV's aerodynamic design. Sophisticated algorithms are constantly attempting to predict its future trajectory, factoring in its known speed and any observed deviations.
3. Interception Tasking: Based on the predicted trajectory and engagement zones, a command center tasks an advanced interceptor. This interceptor might be a new generation missile with a highly agile flight control system and a powerful onboard seeker.
4. MidCourse Correction: As the interceptor flies, it receives updated positional data for the HGV via a secure data link. If the HGV makes a significant maneuver, the interceptor’s guidance system recalculates the intercept solution and executes a midcourse correction burn.
5. Terminal Engagement: As the HGV nears the interceptor's optimal engagement window, the interceptor’s seeker head (e.g., an advanced radar or EO/IR seeker) takes over primary tracking. The seeker must lock onto the maneuvering HGV and provide realtime guidance to the interceptor's warhead or kinetic kill vehicle.
6. Kill Assessment: The interceptor attempts to achieve a "hittokill" or a very close engagement to disable the HGV. Postengagement sensors would assess the outcome.

Conclusion:

Intercepting the DF17 is not a matter of simply upgrading existing systems; it requires a fundamental rethinking of missile defense architecture. It demands advancements in every facet of the kill chain: detection, tracking, prediction, guidance, interceptor technology, and command and control. The development and deployment of effective countermeasures against hypersonic glide vehicles are ongoing, and the landscape of missile defense is in constant flux as nations strive to stay ahead of emerging threats. The current consensus is that while progress is being made, a completely foolproof defense against such a sophisticated weapon remains a significant, and perhaps insurmountable, challenge in the near to midterm future.

把核talos捡回来，标6核战斗部款。

在我军核能力追上美军以前这招起码能拖一段时间。

此处应 @山高县

1. 上升段拦截。仍在大气层内爬升且尚未加速至高马赫的目标，用针对性改进后的空空导弹就能打下来。对敌对势力而言，困难在于：a）空基拦截平台几乎没有在我IADS笼罩范围内长期生存的可能；b）即便空基拦截平台得以生存，覆盖辽阔潜在发射地域所需的平台数量也是财政上不现实的。天基上升段拦截现阶段技术上不成立，未来技术成熟后仍面临空基平台的 b 困境。陆/海基上升段拦截对远离海岸线的导弹发射阵地无效，就算试图拦截从沿海发射的导弹，处于追赶态势的拦截弹也必须具备远高于目标的加速能力，这一假设在对抗双方技术层级类似的条件下无法成立，鹰酱因此自行放弃了该领域的努力。
2. 中段拦截。当前所有中段拦截都只能拦截大气层外的目标，大气层内滑翔的 DF-17 对鹰酱耗费巨资打造的中段拦截手段直接无视。
3. 末段拦截。THAAD，SM-6，PAC-3 等对进入末段俯冲模式的 DF-17 均存在一定的拦截成功概率，但 THAAD 横向机动能力有限，单发杀伤概率极低，SM-6 和 PAC-3 则射高不够，拦截窗口太窄，俯冲而下的 DF-17 至多只需十几秒即可穿透其有效防御带。并且 DF-17 的雷达隐形措施能够有效降低防空导弹雷达寻的头的作战效能。
4. 综上，集火攻击条件下 DF-17 基本可视为无法拦截。至于不好预警这就是某些人瞎扯淡了。高超滑翔的气动发热很容易被探测，导弹战斗部尺度物体的雷达隐形对于工作波长较长的预警雷达而言基本无效，高空滑翔体的雷达地平线/水天线距离也相当地大，假设滑翔高度为4万米，则雷达水天线距离约为800千米。高超滑翔武器的意义在于，依靠（相对于强敌现有拦截手段的）技术代差碾压，即便明火执仗地杀过去，对方也缺乏有效的抗击手段。