如何看待美联储主席鲍威尔在全球央行年会上发表演讲。将允许通胀率“适度”高于2%，以抵消疲弱期的影响？ 第1页

这是个非常有趣的问题，故事可能得从头说起。但可惜知乎现在不能发图，这就让很多简单的解释变得复杂起来.....

十年前的今天，伯南克同样在杰克逊霍尔，他面对了一个一模一样的问题，当时大家想让他调整通胀目标，我们来看看他是怎么回复的

A rather different type of policy option, which has been proposed by a number of economists, would have the Committee increase its medium-term inflation goals above levels consistent with price stability. I see no support for this option on the FOMC. Conceivably, such a step might make sense in a situation in which a prolonged period of deflation had greatly weakened the confidence of the public in the ability of the central bank to achieve price stability, so that drastic measures were required to shift expectations. Also, in such a situation, higher inflation for a time, by compensating for the prior period of deflation, could help return the price level to what was expected by people who signed long-term contracts, such as debt contracts, before the deflation began.
However, such a strategy is inappropriate for the United States in current circumstances. Inflation expectations appear reasonably well-anchored, and both inflation expectations and actual inflation remain within a range consistent with price stability. In this context, raising the inflation objective would likely entail much greater costs than benefits. Inflation would be higher and probably more volatile under such a policy, undermining confidence and the ability of firms and households to make longer-term plans, while squandering the Fed's hard-won inflation credibility. Inflation expectations would also likely become significantly less stable, and risk premiums in asset markets--including inflation risk premiums--would rise. The combination of increased uncertainty for households and businesses, higher risk premiums in financial markets, and the potential for destabilizing movements in commodity and currency markets would likely overwhelm any benefits arising from this strategy.

伯南克拒绝了这种想法，原因是虽然大家想提高通胀目标的诉求是合理的（之前通胀低迷了一段时间，需要补偿之前低通胀的时间），但他依然觉得这个东西弊大于利，因为这可能会带来更高的通胀，让预期变得不稳定（能提高一次为什么不能再提高一次，我自己觉得这其实是今天鲍威尔要蛇足加上那句话的潜在原因，可惜他真的不善沟通）

所以有时候研究经济问题会很有乐趣，刚刚好十年后，人类第二次踏入同样的河流，做出了不同的选择。

所以一个最直接的问题是：这十年间发生了啥

我第一个想到的是欧央行以前的某个副行长....他在欧债危机后说欧元区要把通胀目标提高到4%...以便补偿之前的低通胀时期。有时候真的看历史会有一种哑然失笑的感觉，你永远想不到有多少人会重复做同样错误的事情.......

然后我们都知道欧洲别说4%的目标了，2%都达不到...

美国呢？伯南克在上面那段话里面觉得联储的通胀预期和通胀目标是合适的，然后美国从2010-2020年依然是低通胀低失业的情况。

实际上在这一点上，我觉得中国的研究者和人民银行比联储和美国的研究者要更进一步。我们很早就提出了货币-信用的体系，货币政策是针对无信用风险抵押品的政策，而信用政策是针对有信用风险抵押品的政策

当ECB和FED不能用枪口指导要求金融机构承担信用风险的时候，通胀是很难起来的，因为通胀实际上是一个经济滞后指标，货币政策作为先行指标，要经过同步指标才能传导到滞后指标，经济同步指标或者说经济本身，就是一个承担风险的过程。我的看法是：没有风险的承担，就没有经济指标的传导，利率再低，银行不承担信用风险，就不会有M2的上行，企业不承担经营风险，就没有M2向M1的活化。而如果企业拿了现金都去买国债，社会消费品零售总额和工业增加值能涨起来就见鬼了。没有消费和工业投资，通胀从何而来呢..

大家可能会想，哦，可能欧美是自由经济体，所以不能枪口指导银行放贷款。实际上他们做得更有意思，非但不支持...他们甚至开始限制银行的信用风险承担过程，2008年开始QE，2012年开始限制银行....从此银行股市净率一落千丈。从2008年之前的均值PB为2左右，到今天一些GSIB银行PB不到0.6

所以我其实一直以来都有一个朴素的观点。

如果不放松对于银行的监管，就不会有通胀。如果要做多通胀预期，一定要把低市净率的银行股考虑在内。

当然似乎国内用了另外一种方法，尝试用券商的直接融资去替代银行的信用扩张，所以我有个很看起来很奇葩但我很相信的观点：券商这一轮周期中，与其说是非银金融板块，不如说是通胀板块。