如何评价知乎用户侃叔对沙甸进行辟谣的专栏文章？ 第1页

巧的很，燕京学堂的Alice Su前些时候也去了沙甸，后在纽约客上发表了一篇文章，所见所闻与这位有异，链接和全文如下，供大家参考，见仁见智。

链接：Harmony and Martyrdom Among China’s Hui Muslims

全文：

THe Martyr’s Memorial in Shadian, China, is a gray pillar topped with a crescent moon, set on a stone block engraved with names. It commemorates the so-called Shadian incident, a massacre that took place in July of 1975, when the People’s Liberation Army came to this small southwestern town to quell what the central authorities were calling an Islamist revolt. Then, as now, Shadian was inhabited almost entirely by Hui, members of one of the country’s two main Muslim minority groups. In the years leading up to the incident, the Red Guards had attacked the Hui, destroying their mosques and forcing them to wear pigs’ heads around their necks. When the P.L.A. soldiers arrived, they razed more than four thousand houses and killed some sixteen hundred villagers in one week. The Chinese government later apologized for the raid, blaming it on the Gang of Four—the ousted architects of the Cultural Revolution—and helping fund Shadian’s reconstruction. But locals do not pay homage to the state at the memorial. The pillar is emblazoned with the Fatiha, the first chapter of the Koran, in green Arabic calligraphy, and, above it, in Chinese characters, the word she-xi-de. “That’s the Arabic word shahid, instead of lieshi, the Chinese word for ‘martyr,’ “ a man named Huang told me. (As with the other Chinese Muslims I spoke with, I will protect his identity by referring to him only by his surname.) “You know why? Lieshi would include the P.L.A. soldiers, wouldn’t it?”

（沙甸烈士纪念碑是一个立在刻满名字的石块上顶着新月的灰色柱子。它是为了纪念所谓的“沙甸事件”所立，1975年7月当地发生大屠杀，当时解放军进入这个西南小镇镇压中央政府称为的伊斯兰叛乱。那是如同现在，沙甸主要居民都是回族，中国两个主要的穆斯林少数民族之一。在沙甸事件之前，红卫兵袭击回民，摧毁清真寺，强迫回民脖子上带上猪头。当解放军到达沙甸，他们把超过四千所房屋夷为平地，在一周内杀害大约1600名村民。后来中国政府为此道歉，把责任推给四人帮，帮助沙甸重建。但是当地居民并不领情。纪念柱上用中阿文字刻上了可兰经的首章（ Fatiha）。“这是阿拉伯文shahid，而不是烈士，Martyr的中文翻译” ，一个姓Huang的男人告诉我，“你知道为什么吗？烈士会包括那些解放军，难道不是吗？“）

Huang and I were standing on a hill overlooking Shadian, whose twelve thousand residents are about ninety-per-cent Hui. (Huang, a Muslim convert, is a member of China’s Han ethnic majority.) Most Chinese know little about the town. When I told people in Kunming, the capital of Yunnan province, that I was going there, they asked whether I was visiting for the famous halal barbecue. Shadian is otherwise best known for its Grand Mosque, a nineteen-million-dollar edifice built almost entirely with private donations, its gilding and green domes patterned after those of the Nabawi mosque in Medina, complete with imported date palms lining the entrance. It had stormed earlier that afternoon, the sound of thunder and rain mixing with a lilting call to prayer, followed by fifteen minutes of Koranic teaching blared over the mosque’s loudspeakers in Mandarin. Now Shadian’s minarets pointed quietly into a clear sky. The smell of grass filled the air as Huang and I walked around the monument, tracing the names carved into the base.

（Huang和我站在一个小山丘上俯瞰沙甸，1.2万居民中超过90%都是回族。（Huang是汉族，中国的多数民族，但皈依了伊斯兰教）巨大多数中国人对这个小镇知之甚少。当我在昆明（云南省会）说我要去沙甸时，他们问我去那儿是不是为了著名的清真烧烤。沙甸的大清真寺同样特别有名，耗资1900万美元，几乎全靠私人捐赠，镀金和绿色穹顶的风格酷似麦地那圣寺，入口处排列着进口的枣椰树。下午早时有暴风雨，雷声和雨声混杂着抑扬顿挫的祈祷声，之后是15分钟的可兰经宣教声。现在沙甸的尖塔笔直地插入蓝天。当我和Huang绕着纪念柱，抚摩柱基上的名字，青草的清香萦浮在空气之中。）

The history of the Hui in Yunnan is one of seasons of prosperity punctuated by violence. The province wasn’t part of China until the thirteenth century, when Sayyid Ajjal Shams al-Din Omar al-Bukhari, a Central Asian Muslim who served the imperial court, brought it into the fold. According to Ahmed, an imam at one of Kunming’s mosques, many Hui still revere Sayyid Ajjal, because he demonstrated that Islam could coexist with Chinese philosophy. “Chinese tradition teaches the dao of man, and Islam teaches the dao of heaven—the two are complementary,” Ahmed said. Sayyid Ajjal builtConfucian academies alongside mosques and Buddhist temples, infusing foreign religion and culture with domestic ideals of harmony and hierarchy. “This is why Hui can mix with Han, but Uighurs can’t,” Ahmed continued, referring to China’s other significant Muslim minority. “We have Islam with Chinese characteristics.” Nevertheless, relations between the Hui and the Han have not always been peaceful. In the nineteenth century, during the Qing dynasty, tensions between the two groups erupted over how Yunnan’s mineral resources were being apportioned. Qing officials ordered a xi Hui—a washing away of the Hui—slaughtering at least four thousand people in the course of three days in 1856. That massacre sparked a sixteen-year rebellion, which ended with another massacre, this time of at least ten thousand Hui.

（云南回族的历史是众多由冲突引发繁荣的时期之一。云南在13世纪时仍不属于中国，直到Sayyid Ajjal Shams al-Din Omar al-Bukhari，一个在宫廷任职的中亚穆斯林，将其划为中国疆域。据一个昆明清真寺的伊玛目Ahmed所言，许多回族至今仍尊崇Sayyid Ajjal，因为他证明了伊斯兰可以和中国哲学并存。Amhed说：“中国传统教导人之道，伊斯兰教导天之道——这两者是互补的。”Sayyid Ajjal在清真寺和佛寺边建造了孔子学院，将外来的宗教和文化与本土的和谐、阶级思想融合。Amhed接着提到了中国另一个穆斯林少数民族：“这就是为什么回族能与汉族融合，而维吾尔族不行，我们拥有中国特色的伊斯兰。”不过，回汉关系并非一致和平。在19世纪清朝时期，回汉之间就云南矿产资源如何分配的问题爆发了冲突。1856年，清廷官员下令洗回——即清洗回族——在3天之内屠杀了至少4000人。这场屠杀激起了一场16年的反叛，这场反叛以另一场屠杀宣告终结，这次又造成10000回人被杀）

After the Shadian incident, as China’s economy opened up, the Hui flourished again. They operated private copper, lead, and zinc mines, some of which outcompeted state-owned enterprises. Wealth brought them relative religious freedom, and with a steady flow of zakat, the Muslim equivalent of a tithe, Shadian’s citizens built mosques and madrassas, giving scholarships to religious students and sending hundreds of Hui on the hajj each year. Seeing potential for Shadian to attract religious tourists from Southeast Asia, provincial authorities began marketing the town as the “little Mecca of the East.” They allowed street signs in Arabic and even a green dome on the local administration building’s roof.

（沙甸事件以后，中国经济开始开放，回族又恢复繁荣。他们私营铜铅锌矿，其中有些已经胜过了国营矿业。财富带给他们相对的宗教自由；来源稳定的zakat（天课），即穆斯林的捐税，让沙甸人民能够建造清真寺和伊斯兰学校，奖励伊斯兰学生，每年送上千回族人去麦加朝圣。省政府看到沙甸作为景点可能吸引来自东南亚的信教游客的潜力，便开始将其推为“东方小麦加”。他们允许街道标志上印有阿拉伯语，甚至在地方政府大楼上加上了绿色拱顶。）

Things changed in 2014. On March 1st of that year, a group of knife-wielding attackers began stabbing passengers at random in the Kunming train station, killing more than thirty and injuring more than a hundred and forty. Police shot four of the attackers at the scene, and three others were later executed; one woman was sentenced to life in prison. They were Uighurs from the far-western province of Xinjiang, known for its restive separatism and ethnic strife. When news emerged that the Kunming attackers had spent time in Shadian, droves of Chinese netizens began criticizing the town’s religious appearance, calling it “China’s Islamic State.” The little Hui town became vilified as an enclave for religious extremism, where too many Muslims were allowed too much freedom. Popular online forums such as Tianya Club and Baidu became filled with Islamophobic vitriol. “Can these yellow-skinned Arabs stop disgusting us Chinese people?” http://bbs.tianya.cn/m/post-worldlook-1111687-1.shtml. “We know that huaxia”—the Han ethnicity’s ancestral tribe and culture—“is a pile of shit in your hearts. Why are you still here?” As Han chauvinism swept the Chinese Internet, authorities instituted a series of “counter-extremism” policies, tightening at least the image of control over Yunnan’s Muslims by planting flags in front of every mosque, painting green roofs white, and requiring all religious students and teachers from outside provinces to go home. Hundreds of Uighurs were deported to Xinjiang.

（一切都在2014年改变。那一年的3月1日，一群持刀袭击者在昆明火车站对乘客随意砍杀，造成30人以上死亡，140人以上受伤。警察当场击毙了4名袭击者，另有3人之后被处决，还有一名女性被判处无期徒刑。他们是来自西部省份新疆的维吾尔族，那里以难以管控的分离主义和民族冲突而闻名。当有新闻报道称袭击者曾在沙甸逗留，许多中国网民开始批评这个城镇的宗教外观，称其为“中国的伊斯兰国”。这个回族小镇被蔑称为宗教极端主义的一块飞地，过多的穆斯林在这里得到了过分的自由。流行的在线论坛比如天涯和贴吧都充满谈伊色变的抨击。一个评论者说道：“这些黄皮肤的阿拉伯人能停止恶心我们吗？”“我们知道华夏”——汉族的远古部落及文化——“在你们心里狗屁不如。为什么你们还呆在中国？”当汉族沙文主义扫遍中国互联网时，政府制定了一系列“反极端主义”的政策，至少从表面上收紧了对于云南穆斯林的控制，比如在每一个清真寺门口树立国旗，把绿色的屋顶刷成白色，让所有来自外省的宗教学生和老师回家。上千名维吾尔人被驱逐回新疆。)

As all of this was happening, Huang moved to Shadian with his wife and daughter. “We came for her education,” Huang told me, nodding through wire-rimmed glasses at his nine-year-old. Huang is a native of Yangzhou prefecture, with a background in geological engineering. Twenty years ago, he converted to Islam and started an unlicensed magazine devoted to philosophy, culture, and politics. After five years of private publishing and distribution via mosques, halal stores, and cultural centers, the magazine became well-known in Muslim circles, including in Xinjiang, which got it banned. “So I changed the name and stopped distributing there,” Huang said with a shrug. His new publication has been circulating for fifteen years.

（在这一切发生的时候，Huang和自己的妻女来到沙甸。Huang通过眼镜框向9岁的女儿点头，同时对我说“我们来这儿是为了她的教育”。Huang是扬州人，有地理工程师的背景。20年前，他开始信伊斯兰教，并开始发行一本未经授权的杂志，讨论哲学，文化和政治。在清真寺、清真餐馆、文化中心私下出版发行这本杂志5年之后，这本杂志开始在穆斯林中小有名气，包括在新疆，结果遭到封杀。Huang耸了耸肩说：“所以我改了杂志的名字，而且不在新疆发行了。”他的新杂志已经流通了15年。）

Huang and his wife came to Islam from atheist Han Chinese families. They both had Hui friends who roused their curiosity, prompting them to learn about the religion for themselves. For Huang, spiritual hunger was directly linked to intellectual control, and filling one meant breaking out of the other. The purpose of his magazine, he said, was to awaken his compatriots in spirit and mind. “There is an emptiness in Chinese society,” Huang told me over a dinner of spicy fish hotpot. Authoritarianism made people tools of the system, he said, without god or purpose in life. “Chinese people have been taught slavishness for thousands of years: follow tradition and don’t question authority,” he said. “Then the Cultural Revolution destroyed tradition. What we have now is authority but no questions, because people don’t remember how to ask them.” Just as asking questions had led him to faith, he wanted faith to make people start asking questions. “Han are an ethnicity with no real belief system, just superstitions and worshipping with no idea what or why,” he said. “But most Hui have no idea what Islam means, either.”

(Huang和他的妻子从汉族无神论家庭皈依伊斯兰。他们的回族朋友引起他们的好奇心，鼓励他们学习宗教。对Huang而言，精神空虚与思想控制直接相关，皈依宗教意味着突破思想束缚。他说，创办杂志的目的就是为了启迪同胞的心智。“中国社会普遍精神空虚”，在吃鱼火锅的时候Huang告诉我。威权主义使人们成为体制的工具，没有神或者生活目的。“中国人已经被灌输奴性几千年了，遵循传统，不去质疑权威”，他说，“然后文革摧毁了传统。我们现在只有权威没有怀疑。因为人们从不去问问题。”当问及导致他皈依的问题时，他希望信仰能够引导人们去质疑。“汉族是一个没有真正信仰的民族，只有迷信和没有怀疑的崇拜。但是大多数回族也不知道伊斯兰真正的含义。”)

The same day that Huang and I visited the Martyr’s Memorial, he proudly took me on a tour of Yufeng Academy, an elementary school founded in the early twentieth century and once run by the Hui scholar Bai Liangcheng, who is known for having reformed Hui curricula to include Confucian classics alongside lessons in Arabic and the Koran. “Shadian is a cradle of Chinese Islamic civilization,” Huang said, as we strolled through exhibits honoring the town’s prominent Hui: Ma Jian, who studied at Cairo’s Al-Azhar University in the nineteen-thirties, translated the Koran into Mandarin, and founded the Arabic department at Peking University; Lin Xingzhi, who performed the hajj thirty-eight times and became a diplomatic representative of the Republic of China in Saudi Arabia; and Lin Song, who was once photographed presenting a Chinese Koran to Yasir Arafat.

(我和Huang参观纪念柱的同一天，他自豪地带我游览了Yufeng学院，这是20世纪早期由回族学者Bai Liangcheng执掌的初级学校。他对回族教程进行了改革，把孔子经典和阿拉伯课以及可兰经放在一起。当我和他徜徉在当地回族名人展览时，Huang对我说，“沙甸是中国伊斯兰文化的发祥地。”Ma jian曾经19世纪在开罗 Al-Azhar 大学学习，把可兰经翻译成汉语，创建了北京大学的阿语系。Lin Xingzhi曾经三十八次去麦加朝圣，成为中华民国驻沙特的外交官。Lin Song把一本汉语可兰经送给阿拉法特。)

Yet Shadian’s scars were visible nearby, too. A few streets away from the academy, I met a man named Hajji Wang, who was thirty-one when the Shadian incident happened. He and his six-year-old son had hidden outside of the village, he said, listening to the explosions and screams for seven days straight. “Every house had piles of dead people, some with babies still on their backs,” Wang told me. Now he and his family live in an airy villa with a bubbling fountain in its front garden, the archway over its entrance inscribed with the Arabic phrase Bismillah ar-Rahman ar-Rahim—“In the name of God, the most gracious, the most merciful.” The family’s wealth comes from a metals factory that they own, and over the years they’ve given more than fifteen million dollars to Shadian’s mosques and madrassas. “The old days were dark as hell,” Wang said. “You couldn’t think about faith. Class enemies were everywhere. Everyone was lying. Everything was fake. It’s different now.”

(然而沙甸的伤疤不远处依旧清晰可见。就在这所学院几条街远，我遇到一个叫wang Hajji的男人。当沙甸事件发生时，他31岁。他和他6岁的儿子藏在村子外面，听到爆炸声和尖叫声7日不绝。Wang告诉我，“每个房子都有死人堆，有些背上还带着孩子。”现在他和家人住在一个明亮的别墅里，前面花园里有个喷泉，拱门上刻着阿语短句，

“In the name of God, the most gracious, the most merciful.” 这个家庭的财富来自拥有的金属厂，过去多年他们已经捐了1500多万美元给沙甸清真寺和宗教学校。“过去的日子堪比地狱，你不能思考信仰，到处都是阶级敌人，所有人都在撒谎，所有都是假的，现在不同了。”)

My last night in Shadian was spent with Huang and his neighbor Fu, drinking cup after cup of fermented pu’er tea as the Grand Mosque glowed outside Huang’s living-room window. When I asked what “Islam with Chinese characteristics” meant, Huang pointed to the plaza facing the mosque. “There’s a set of plaques there that says ai guo ai jiao—‘love your country, love your religion,’ “ he said. All the Hui will dutifully repeat this slogan, he added, but the question is what ai guo means. Does loving one’s country mean loving its government? Holding it accountable? Asking for justice? If authorities destroyed the Grand Mosque today, would ai guo mean resistance?

(我最后一天在沙甸和Huang和他的邻居Fu在一起喝普洱茶。大清真寺在Huang起居室窗外闪闪发光。当我问有中国特点的伊斯兰是什么意思时，Huang指着清真寺前的广场说，“那里有一组标牌说

爱国爱教。”所有的回族都会忠诚地重复这个口号，但是问题是爱国是什么意思。爱国意味着爱政府？追责？寻求正义？如果政府今天拆掉大清真寺，爱国会意味着反抗吗？）

Fu snorted from across the table. “Old Huang, you delusional intellectual,” he said. “If the state wanted to destroy that mosque, they would. You couldn’t do anything about it.” Fu’s father was one of ten Hui representatives who petitioned Beijing for help before the 1975 massacre. He now holds a high position in a local mining company, but has vowed never to go into politics. The Hui of Shadian want exactly what average people all over China want, Fu said—life without interference. That is why Yunnan’s Hui didn’t resist when the Uighurs were deported. It didn’t affect them, nor did the state’s security measures before or after the Kunming station attack. “Politicians made up the idea that Shadian is a terrorist place so they could then say, ‘We’re so good at counterterrorism,’ “ Fu said. “Our lives here are exactly the same. The only change is that every politician has given himself a promotion.” The single most Chinese characteristic of the Hui is probably that they are realistic, Fu added. “Let’s be clear and objective about who we are. We’re less than one per cent of the population. We’re weaklings. There’s a political game going on, and we are not part of it.”

(Fu隔着桌子嗤之以鼻，“老Huang，你这是知识分子的痴心妄想。如果政府想要拆掉清真寺，就会拆。你做不了任何事。”Fu的父亲是当年上京情愿的十名回族代表之一。他现在在当地一家矿企身居高位，但是已经发誓不参与任何政治。Fu说，沙甸回族和全中国普通人想要的东西一样，那就是不受干预的生活。这就是为什么维族人遣返回时云南回族不反抗。这不影响他们，也不影响政府的维稳措施，无论是昆明火车站袭击事件发生之前还是发生之后。”政府官员编造说沙甸是恐怖分子聚集地，所以他们可以自称，自己很善于反恐。我们的日子还是一样过。唯一的变化就是每个官员都升职了。”回族最中国化的一个特征大概就是他们很现实，Fu加了一句，“让我们清楚客观一点。我们占全国人口不到百分之一。我们是弱势群体。政治游戏我们参与不进来。”)

“If you want to put it that way, everyone in China is a weakling,” Huang said. Wasn’t the difference between Muslims and atheists that they had a standard of righteousness? Wouldn’t Shadian’s people stand up if their holy places were torn down? “Sure, blood would be shed, but so what?” Fu said. “We’re a minority. We’re drops. We’re not going to dye the ocean.”

(“你也可以这么理解，每个中国人都是弱者，“ Huang说。难道穆斯林和无神论者的区别不正是在于穆斯林有正义的标准？如果他们的圣地被摧毁，沙甸人会站起来吗？”肯定会流血，但是那又怎样？“Fu说，”我们是少数民族，我们很弱小，我们不会去以卵击石。”)

Reporting for this piece was facilitated by a grant from the Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting.

Alice Su is a journalist based in Beijing, China.

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